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ZIMBABWE’S FOOD INSECURITY PARADOX: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR GRAIN MARKET REFORM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA1
^  \  T.S. Jayne and Munhamo Chisvo2 2
Abstract: The structure of Zimbabwe’s grain market, while ,
stimulating production and incomes in high-potential smallholder areas \
since independence, has actually contributed to food insecurity among 
grain-deficit households, in semi-arid areas. Results of an econometric 
model indicate that , over 100,000 tonnes of expensive commercial 
maize meal flow annually into rural areas while grain flows out 
through the official marketing channel. This circuitous movement of 
grain, a symptom of poorly functioning informal rural grain m arkets,.
.< : has effectively reduced incomes among poor rural consumers by as
much as 30 percent. The promotion of informal rural trade w ill: 
require the removal of government restrictions and attention to other 
s critical barriers to private investment in grain trading.
/
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T.S. Jayne and Munhamo Chisvo
Zimbabwe has a food insecurity paradox: the threefold expansion of marketed grain 
output among smallholders since 1980 and overflowing state grain silos, existing 
. concomitantly with widespread chronic malnutrition.3 While malnutrition has many 
causes, inadequate access, to food is clearly one of .the most important in Zimbabwe > 
(NSC,'1991). Inadequate, purchasing power arpong .the poor is often cited as the 
reason why food insecurity can persist amidst food abundance. This explanation, -  
masks the underlying structural determinants of income distribution that give rise to 
poverty and hunger. ^ /
This paper argues that the structure of grain markets in Zimbabwe has eroded real 
incomes and food security among grain-deficit, relatively poor rural households while 
simultaneously stimulating-the well-publicized growth in aggregate grain sales and . 
incomes documented elsewhere (Stanning, 1989; Jackson and Collier, 1987). 
Underdeveloped informal grain markets, constrained by government restrictions and ; 
other barriers to investment, have failed to provide viable outlets for surplus grain 
production, causing supplies to be effectively siphoned out of semi-arid rural areas  ^
through the formal .marketing channels.4 This, creates localized shortages later in 1 
the season as deficit households deplete their own grain stocks. As a result, large
/ ZIMBABWE’S FOOD INSECURITY PARADOX:
IMPLICATIONS FOR GRAIN MARKET REFORM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
3v A  graphic illustration of this paradox occurred on 14 June 1990, when separate 
accounts of huge food, surpluses and widespread starvation were reported o'n opposite 
pages of Zimbabwe’s major newspaper (The Herald, p.3 and p.4). ,The Ministry of 
Health estimates that 30% of Zimbabwean children under five are'. chronically 
malnourished; this figure is as high as .36% in the drier, provinces of the country (Central 
Statistics Office, 1989, p .94).
•'v Ttje' '-'formairimarkefinl channel is comprised of farmers selling produce, to the 
Grain Marketing Board (GMB) or any pf its licensed agents, urban commercial millers 
who procure grain directly from the GMB,. and retail shops that sell the commercial 
meal. By contrast, "informal” markets involve households and traders: selling grain to 
buyers other than the GMB or its agents. This channel also includesrinillers (mostly 
located in communal areas) that process grain moving through informal ,channels. The 
distinction between legal and illegal informal trade is covered below. ’
volumes of expensive coritmercial maize meal flow into these areas to satisfy 
consumer demand at the same time that grain flows out through the formal channels. 
Therefore, grain "surpluses" delivered from various communal areas to G.MB depots, 
While giving the illusion of self-sufficiency, may mask arid even contribute to 
considerable food insecurity in these areas..
This circuitous movement of grain, a symptom of poorly functioriing informal rural 
grain, markets, inflates rural grain prices arid has effectively reduced cash incomes ‘ 
among poor rural consumers by as much as 30 percent. At the same time, relatively 
wealthy, grain surplus smallholders have benefited from the system, as the 
government’s investment in formal marketing infrastructure in communal areas'since 
1980 has provided reliable outlets for their surplus production. Consequently, the. 
organization and performarice o f the marketing system has contributed to the highly 
Skewed distribution o f income' among the rural population observed by. other ■ 
researchers (Stannirig, 1989; Rohrbach, 1989).
The case of Zimbabwe may be relevant to other countries in Southern Africa '■ V 
experiencing persistent food insecurity amidst food abundance. Contrary to views : 
that government subsidies, are necessary to improve food consumption among the 
— ' poor, we argue that selective; restructuring of the grain market may simultaneously 
reducefooci insecurity and government budget costs.; Such a strategy must be based 
v on the development of competitive intra-riiral markets that provide iriore direct 
channels betweeri grain surplus and deficit households in the communal areas. The 
development of intra-rural markets■—.■.designed to operate alongside rather than 
replace the formal marketing channel— may reduce superfluous grain movements 
through the formal sector and thus reduce transport costs, shift maize milling to the ' 
informal sector where milling margins are. about one-half that of the formal 
commercial mills, and reduce the volume of maize handled at significant loss by the ' 
GMB iri semi-arid areas of the country. These changes could greatly reduce the cost 
, of maize meal for consumers in rural areas. — .—
The promotion o f informal rural trade will not require the government to relinquish
control x>f maize pricing and distribution tasks that it currently performs. Rather, it 
will require (1) the removal of several government marketing restrictions that 
currently make informal grain trading unprofitable and risky, arid (2) active, 
government support.for private and cooperative investment and new entry into rural 
grain trading, storage, transport and milling. These changes would facilitate grain 
access for rural consumers where the single-channel GMB system has not been able' 
to reach, while still allowing the GMB. to Carry out important tasks related to urban 
food security, buffer sto^k management, and price stability.
This report is based on preliminary results of surveys of 648 households, 124 grain 
and/or grain m eal traders, 52 informal millers, 5 GMB depot managers and 2 GMB 
inspectors operating in 7 communal areas situated in Natural Regions III, IV and 
V.5 These communal areas were Gokwe, Buhera, Mberengwa, Shurugwi, Runde, 
Nkayi, and Kana. The period of study was between the harvest of April 1989, which 
was relatively poor in terms of rainfall, and April 1990.
GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES AND THE GRAIN MARKETING SYSTEM: 
A •MEANS-ENDS INCONSISTENCY? :.V .V
Rural income growth has been,a prime objective of the Government of Zimbabwe 
since independence in 1980 (Government of Zimbabwe, 1983). Primary instruments 
of this rural income objective have been grain pricing ahd marketing policies, in 
particular (a) producer prices consiistently above export parity, especially for small 
grains; (b) an expansion of GMB buying points-in communal lands to stimulate 
marketed output by smailholderS, and (c) h inassive infusion of government credit ■/: 
recouped from crop sales to the GMB. These policies were part of a set of factors 
that induced the dramatic rise in GMB grain intake from the smallholder sector 
(Rohrbach, 1^89). /’Vy "•;■ ; iV'-VV
5 Zimbabwe is divided into five agro-climatic natural regions(NRs) ranked I, II, III, 
IV and V. NRs I and II receive the highest rainfall and are suitable for intensive crop 
production. NRs IV and, V receive under 650 him of average, annual rainfall, and are 
prone to frequent drought. Sixty percent of Zimbabwe’s communal population lives in
NRs IV and V. ; . ‘ V - y  / . ’V:
The emphasis on policies) that raise the returns from smallholder grain sales as a 
means to raise rural incomes implicitly assumes an image of surplus rural producers. 
This image is contradicted somewhat by a set of recent household surveys in 
Zimbabwe’s semi-arid Communal areas. First, it appears that most smallholders in 
the drier communal lands sell little' or no grain. Throughout all Nrs smallholder 
grain sales are highly concentrated among well-endowed farmers, primarily in the 
most productive agricultural areas. Ten percent of the households in a given area 
typically account for over half,of-the total grain sales (Table 1). v ^
Second, between 50 and 100 percent of smallholder families in Nrs IV and V are 
typically net purchasers of grain. The . exact proportion of grain-deficit farm 
households depends on the particular geographical area and the quality o f the 
harvest. The government’s incomes policy has largely bypassed these households. 
Their incomes are substantially more sensitive to the consumer price of commercial 
maize meal than the GMB producer price. These farmers appear unable to respond 
significantly to production incentives because of limited assets such as land, draft 
animals, farm equipment, non-farm income to finance investments in improved 
technology, poor rural transport infrastructure, poor soil and erratic rainfall.
Third, Smallholders selling the most grain tended to have, higher incomes and grain 
consumption. Household surveys in two semi-arid communal areas indicated that, 
at the. .01 level of significance, smallholder grain sales were positively correlated with 
per capita income, grain availability per household member and crop sales from 
oilseeds, and cotton (Chigume and Jayne, forthcoming). The poorest households 
tended to have'relatively few productive assets and w'ere generally purchasers of 
grain.
Fourth* there are distinct grain surplus and deficit areas, within particular communal 
areas, and among communal areas in close proximity. If the increased surpluses of 
grain sellers were directly accessible to deficit households, this would reduce 
informal grain prices and benefit consumers.. However, these potential gains have 
been hampered due’;to. the structure of the .grain marketing system. .;,
Table 1: Grain marketing.profile of households in selected semi-arid














% OF TOTAL 
.GRAIN
SALES from the 
LARGEST 10% OF 
GRAIN SELLING 
. HOUSEHOLDS -
% OF ' 
HOUSEHOLDS 
THAT ARE NET 
GRAIN 
PURCHASERS
Gokwe (south)3 111 A average 2,592 ' 51 .. 12
Gokwe (north)3 IV average 159 : V 59 . ' " 59 .
Buher.a
(north)3
. 111 average 496 . • 50 ■ ■ /• 26 .
Buhera
(south)3'
IV, V average . . 87 ' - . 72 ;; ,
; . • G -
- 57 ”
Runde3 111, IV average ■ 3 ■ 74 61
" Mberengwa3 IV, V average -248 , 60 .85 -
; Natab IV below
average ' ,
-275 / 57 , i " 94 '• .
Ramakuebanab ! • V • " below 
average,
-353 68 96 >
Semukweb V below
average
-344 . . ;■ 62 ■' . 98
Source: aU2/MSU/ICRISAT'Gra,in‘ Marketing Surveys’,- 1990; bHedden.-OiinkhorSt/ Bettina, 'The role ofy small grains in
:semi-arid smallholder farming systems in Zimbabwe:' preliminary findings1( draft mimeo, SADCC/ICRISAT, Matopos.
. Note: na=less than five households in this category. ' >
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THE STRUCTURE OF GRAIN MARKETS
There are two channels by which staple maize6 is redistributed from grain sellers 
to consumers in Zimbabwe; the formal system, in which prices and distribution are 
highly controlled by the government, and the informal system, which is unregulated
within communal areas but is nevertheless circumscribed by GMB activities and 
regulations (Figure 1).
The Formal System: .Maize may be sold through the. formal system to one 6f three 
procurement arms of the GMB: (1) GMB depots, normally located in town centers; 
(b) GMB collection points located in rural communal areas; and (c) approved buyers 
(ABs), licensed private traders that buy at mandated, prices on behalf of the GMB. 
GMB prices are pan-seasonal and pan-territorial/- The expansion of GMB buying 
points in communal areas since independence has induced surplus farmers to sell a 
larger proportion qf grain through formal channels. These surpluses are not readily " 
accessible to rural consumers. Once grain is sold to rural collection points or ABs, 
it. cannot be purchased directly by rural consumers. Instead, the grain must be 
forwarded directly to GMB depots, often a considerable distance from grain deficit 
rural areas. This effectively siphons supplies out of rural areas, tightens supply^ 
demand conditions.and exerts upward; pressure on informal market prices.: While 
helping to meet the marketing needs of surplus households, the collection point/AB  
system and associated resale restrictions may actually make staple grain more 
expensive for food insecure households. y :
Once delivered to the depots in town centres, grain may be repurchased for 
distribution back to communal areas. In theory, GMB depots' could play an 
important role in selling maize grain to rural consumers, Yet the volume of grain 
purchased from the GMB by rural consumers largely depends oh the proximity of • 
a particular grain deficit area to the nearest depot. For example, GMB grain sales
6 Maize accounts for 45 percent of the caloric intake in the average Zimbabwean 
diet (USD A, 1988)' ■' ; " - v  ': ' y ' \ : *' y  y ' ' .  . •■.7. -

in Mberengwa Communal Area were substantial during 1990 because a depot is 
located in the middle of this drought-affected area (Table 2). However, direct 
purchases from the GMB dropped markedly in the areas of Mberengwa more than 
40 kilometres from the depot. Most households relied on ox-drawn carts for 
transport. No household surveyed in any communal area located more than 60 
kilometres from the nearest depot bought any grain from the GMB. Therefore, the 
availability of large .grain stocks at GMB depots in town centres throughout the 
country does not necessarily-assure access for consumers in distant rural areas.
Moreover, while the GMB provides free transport services for commercial buyers'in 
urban areas, informal buyers must incur all costs Of transporting grain back to rural 
areas, Most importantly, while GMB depots appear to offer grain for sale in small 
amounts to rural consumers, many will not sell larger amounts to informal traders 
intending to resell the grain in communal areas. Four of five GMB depot managers 
interviewed by U Z /M SU  Food Security Project staff stated that this practice was 
illegal, even though the GMB Marketing Act condones it. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that only 2 percent of GMB’s total maize intake since 1980 has been 
resold, to: informal buyers. ; Commercial millers, stockfeeders and brewers have 
accounted for 77, 8 and 6 percent of GiMB sales. Seven percent of GMB intake has 
been redistributed to rural areas through government food aid programmes.
The formal system appears to perform well in redistributing supplies from
geographically concentrated surpluses in the north to urban consumption centers in 
the south. The government rail linkshetween these regions have resulted in low unit 
transport costs, which have effectively precluded the development of long-distance
informal trade in grain.
. The major shortcoming of the current system is its inability to make.grainavailabre 
to. numerous, geographically dispersed consuming units, in the ;semi-arid communal 
areas where 60 percent of the communal population lives.: There may be large
stocks of grain available at stable prices at GMB depots at town centres throughout 
the country, but this does not necessarily assure access for consumers in distant rural
•Table 2':. clmportanc^ of alternative grain marketing. channels: used by .households, in 
selected semi-arid communal areas i , . .. " :
. COMMUNAL' . 
AREA .
: NATURAL . 
REGION i
OF; TOTAL: HOUSEHOLD GRAIN SALES TO, i 
GMB OR -.}■
• APPROVED '.NEIGHBORING INFORMAL 
BUYERS .HOUSEHOLDS TRADERS ; .
% OF TOTAL HOUSEHOLD GRAIN AND MEAL PURCHASES FROM
1 NEIGHBORING - , INFORMAL . ' ’V -  
GMB HOUSEHOLDS TRADERS - ‘ SHOPKEEPERS
grain -----.......commercial meal r--
, Gokwe (south)*5 ' , . Ill r. i; 86 ' '- 8 6 ' 7 : 80 ; - ■■■ 1 3 ' " 0 /
Gokwe- (north)'5 IV ^ .' ■ 5 95 ' v ■■ io . 10 • 44 36 ;r ' 10 .
, Buhera (north)*5 i n 69 16 15' 16 .70 " . ■ -;1 ■■■. ’■ .13 '
Buhera (south)*5 • .IV, V . 68 \ 31 1. - 0 . 36 ■ , . 11 ^ 53
Runde*5: . < ' III, IV . 30 ' 70 0 0. : ■ 23 v 37 40
.• Mberengwa*5 ?v, v- 43 57 0 '■ . 26 15 17 42 . . v
Natac IV \ '100 \ p ■ ' o i ■ ' ; ■ « ■■■ 7^ 92
Ramakwebanac V ' 0  "
o©
0 - . 0 '' 13a ' ..' - 00 *si
Semykwec, , : v ■ : 0, 100 0 ‘ 0 - 21a . ■’ 79
Note: , aThe'distinction between purchases from households and informal traders was not made in this study. .. . ; : ' ‘ ".
, Source: -UZ/MSU/ICRISAT Grain Marketing; Surveys:, 1990; cHedden-Dunkhorst, Bett^na,1.‘The role of small grains ^ in semi-arid smallholder farming
systems in'Zimbabwe: prelimirany-findings1, draft mimeo, SADCC/ICRISAT, Matopos.
areas. The GMB’s singlerchannel, one-directional distribution system from rural to 
urban centers, assumes rural self-sufficiency in grain (Blackie, 1984). The Grain 
Marketing Act, which specifies the functions and duties of the GMB, contains no 
mandate to deliver and, sell grain beyond its own depots. This is probably justified 
considering the daunting logistical and financial burden that the GMB would incur 
in distributing grain to numerous, geographically dispersed areas with poor roads and 
trading facilities. However, the underlying problem still remains.
The Informal System:■ Competitive grain markets, in the sense of many buyers and 
sellers interacting in open for#, are conspicuously absent in Zimbabwe’s commilrtal 
areas. Most informal grain trade is between surplus and deficit households in close 
proximity, exchanging small quantities (Table 2). This system is unable to achieve, 
economies of scale in bulking and distribution, and cannot efficiently redistribute 
supplies over long distances and into communal areas suffering from severe food 
shortages. v ■
The reliance on sporadic household-to-household trade is a manifestation of the 
underdeveloped and unspecialized nature - of informal grain marketing systems. 
Table 2. indicates that, households’ purchases of grain from informal traders were 
quite low except in norther Gokwe and Runde, two deficit areas contiguous to 
nearby surplus areas. In several grain-deficit wards, no household surveyed was able 
to identify an informal buyer operating in the area (Table 3). ;
The survey of rural shopowners and grain traders revealed that, during the 1989/90 
marketing year, only 43 percent stored grain for more than one month; only seven 
percent ^ stored for more than; three months. All o f  the grain bought by informal 
traders in this sample was resold before October 1989 -- more-than six months 
before the next harvest. This suggests that, apart from storage by farm households, 
the important function of reallocating grain across time through temporal arbitrage 
is performed almost entirely by the state.

This is clear evidence of a problem considering that a substantial marketable grain 
siirplus is often produced in relatively high-potential locations within communal 
areas that are grain-deficit in the aggregate. There appears to be substantial micro- 
variation in productive potential between various locations, within a given communal 
area, especially the larger ones. In the case of northern Gokwe, Buhera, and Runde, 
the grain surpluses, generated in some survey areas were sufficient to , satisfy the 
residual grain and maize meal demanded by the remaining survey households ip 
other parts Of the communal area. Yet this type of exchange, involving the , 
movement of grain up to 100 kilometres, was depressed because very few informal 
traders were available or utilized to link these surplus and deficit areas together.
The GMB and neighboring households apparently provided more profitable or 
convenient market outlets (Table 2). Smallholders in the survey who sold grain to/ 
GMB or neighboring households were asked why they did not sell to informal 
traders instead. Their responses were; no informal buyers were operating nearby
- at time o f sale (48%), other buyers gave higher prices (42%), arid grain sacks could
not be obtained by informal traders (10%). . , / r ' v
, Ironically, the survey of traders identified grain trading, milling and transport as the.
- second, third, and fourth mpst profitable; activities in which to invest in Zimbabwe’s 
rural areas (opening a restaurant/bottle store was first)., However,vonly 32 percent
-'of 'tKe- respondent^ these grain marketing activities expressed an
actual intention to expand investment in any of them. These traders stressed that 
, . major barriers to further investment in informal grain trading were unavailability of  ^
credit to expand bperations ,(73%), unavailability .of vehicles and spares to, buy ;
. (38'$b), and confusion over the legality of certain trading activities (19%). Moreover, .
/ die scope for private tradirig is further restricted by government regulation of the . 
movement and resale o f grain. For example: y " .  , 7
1. Grain is prohibited from crossing Zone A  areas (commercial .farming and 
) /  urban aieas) into Zone B  (communal areas). Furthermore, grain may not
7 V legally pass from surplus Communal areas into deficit communal areas if it 
7  requires passing through a Zone A  area. While some illicit trade has b een .
■ detected the surveys, it is undoubtedly of lower volume and higher cost than
if government were to remove such restrictions and actively encourage such
i -
trade
2. Grain delivered by smallholders to rural collection points or ABs cannot be 
resold, directly to consumers. Instead, the grain must be forwarded to the 
nearest GMB depot, often at considerable expense to farmers and the GMB. 
These resale restrictions, essentially bar the use of these known.local sources 
of grain for procurement and redistribution through informal channels while 
still in the rural areas. a
As a result, after, the GMB buying campaign in which supplies are ferried from rural 
areas to GMB depotsTn town centres, grain is often not available, in sufficient 
quantities through informal channels to Satisfy requirements in semi-arid rural areas.
Consequently, commercial urban-based millers have been able to develop a market 
by distributing their maize meal from urban centres to rural areas. Seventy-four 
percent of households randomly interviewed'in four semi-arid communal areas in' 
1990 stated that they bought commercial meal simply because grain was not. 
available to buy locally.7 For example, in four communal areas in NRs IV and V 
from December 1988 to November 1989, households’ purchases of commercial maize 
meal accounted for up to 92-percent of total grain purchases (Table 4). With the 
exception of Mazvihwa, an areas that received over 170 kgs of maize grain per 
household through food for work.programmes,. commercial meal purchases dwarfed 
Coarse grain purchases of all type, and constituted 24 to 37 percent of households’ 
total grain consumption.
Unfortunately, the refined commercial meal is less nutritious and less preferred than 
the maize meal obtained from informal channels (see below). Most importantly, it 
is more costly. Even during the pre-harvest months of 1.990, commercial maize meal 
was from 10 to 80 percent more expensive per kilogram than the maize obtained and 
milled through informal markets.8 Ironically, the government subsidizes the GMB’s
. 7 Ironically, the commercial millers fill this rural demand by buying grain from the 
GMB, which to some extent procures the grain from surplus households in the same 
areas where the commercial meal is sold. . . . . . . . .  ..
8 Price monitoring surveys were conducted bi-weekly within the seven communal 
area in the sample during 1990.
•V ' \ ' 9
Table H
Importance of Commercial Maize Meal Purchases in Households' Residual Grain Requirements 
















MAIZE MEAL PURCHASES AS % OF:




(4) (5) ( . (6)=(5)/(4+5) . (7)=(5)/(2)
•>
COMMUNAL AREA' ■-t...... kgs,
....... —  —  ■ — — ..... —
RAMAKUEBANA 1073 . 608 ' 465
' 5 8 .394 87 37
MAZVIHWA 1128 684
444 166 19 ‘ 10 2
NATA 1275 908 t
.367 25 o o 92 24
SEMUKWE 1089 .
: 500 ■ ■ -
. i- : '
58? 93 353 79 32
* Consumption is,not equal to grain production^plus grain and mealie meal purchases because of fbod aid 
"Refers,to human food and beer consumption; does not include grain fed to animals.
food for work, gifts, and carryover stocks.
Source: Hedden-Dunkhorst (1990).
AI"' operating margin; if current pressure to reduce these subsidies are implemented, the 
;• gap between formal and informal maize meal prices would likely widen further.
The magnitude of this circuitous movement of grain from rural areas to- GMB 
depots, onward to urban mills, and then back to rural areas for consumption has not 
been accurately quantified and is the subject of some dispute. The following section 
develops a framework for estimating the grain backflow into rural areas and 
empirically estimates its volume in both normal and drought years. .
COMMERCIAL MAIZE MEAL BACKFLOW INTO RURAL AREAS
Survey data on household market behavior is used to develop a monthly econometric 
model to estimate the rural backflow of commercial maize meal. Immediately after 
harvest, most farm households are consuming grain from their own production. At 
this time, demand for commercial meal is confined mainly to urban and rural non- 
: farm households. Consumption among these groups, who produce no grain,'is ; 
assumed to be roughly constant throughout the year. However, as a growing 
proportion of rural households deplete their stocks as the year progresses'.(Figu re :
2), demand for commercial meal’ rises, reaching, a peak during the pre-harvest 
months, after which demand drops off considerably, and is again confined to urban 
and rural non-farm consumers, Therefore, any rise in demand later in the season 
may be attributable largely to rural households running out of own grain stocks. ,
Interviews withgeneral managers of several commercial,milling firmsindicate that 
(a) there, is a I  to 2 week time lag between the purchase of maize from the GMB 
and the time at which it is milled and bagged for distribution, (b) once bagged, the 
maize meal is rapidly.distributed put to distribution points and retail outlets, and (c) 
aside from Working, stocks, these millers do not store maize because of the pan- 
seasonal selling price of the GMB, which effectively performs free storage services 
. for the millers. v  ’ . . V . ” .a ',,;;.
* ^
io  ■'/;'
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■ ■ G R A I N  STOCK DEPLETION COMMERCIAL MEAL PURCHASES
Figure 2: Seasonal pattern of commercial maize meal purchases and the 
cumulative proportion of households depleting grain stocks: Mberengwa' 
and Runde communal areas, 1989-90 Marketing Year
Note: Harvest in Runde (Natural Regions III and IV) and Mberengwa 
.(NRs IV and V) normally occurs in April or'May.. However, households 
may begin eating "green maize" from the new harvest as early as 
February or March.; . -
Source: UZ/MSU/ICRISAT Grain Marketing Surveys, 1990.
- v •
These points indicate that the demand for maize by commercial millers is basically 
a derived demand for maize meal by consumers, with a 2 to 3 week time lag. 
Therefore, the seasonal pattern, of maize purchases by urban millers, lagged several 
weeks/ provides a close proxy for commercial maize meal consumption.
The seasonality of rural demand for commercial meal may be examined statistically 
by contrasting the following models:
(1 )  DEMAND, = Bp + B,’(1>MEAL), + B/CPBREAD), + B3*(RETENTIONS) + et
and ‘ " ■!
(2) ' DEMAND, = B0 + B1*(PMEAL), + B2*(PBREAD), + B3*( RETENTIONS), + B4*(JAN) + B5*(FEB) + ... +
Bw*(NOV) + c, • ’ ’ /
where DEMAND represents maize demanded by commercial mills (a derived 
demand for meal by consumers), PMEAL and PBREAD are the deflated retail 
prices of commercial roller meal and wheat bread,9 and RETENTIONS are annual 
communal maize production minus deliveries to the GMB.10 JAN, FEB, MAR, 
etc., are monthly dummy variables. The hypothesis of no significant rise in rural 
demand later in the season is represented by B4 = B5 = ... = B14 = 0.
Equations (1) and (2) were estimated by OLS using monthly data from the GMB 
and the Ministry of Trade and Industry from April, 1985 to September, 1989. An 
F-test rejected the null hypothesis of no seasonality at the .01 level of significance.
9 Bread is now the second most important source of purchased staple food grain in 
both rural and urban areas o f  Zimbabwe. Demand for sorghum and millet may be more
. important than bread in certain parts of the country when including demand through 
informal channels, yet no data on volumes and prices are available to examine this 
further. . . . . , . .
10 Past research has noted the important inverse relationship between demand for
commercial meal and the quality of the harvest (Blackie, 1984). During drought years; 
for example, annual demand for. commercial meal rises substantially. ’ The less grain 
produced and retained in communal areas, the greater the need for commercial meal to 
be transported into these areas. The demand m odel should also, include a measure of 
national income, yet this data was'not available on a monthly basis. . .
Results for equation (2) are aS-follows (t-statistics in parentheses):11
DEMAND, = 88 834 - 2 572;0*(PMEAL), + 39 778*(PBREAD), - 0.03*(RETENTIONS), + 4 347.3*(JUE) ' 
(2.90) (-2.98) \  (0.76) - (-6.S5) • , (0.83) ;
+ 8 4143*(AUG) + 13 922.0“(SEP) + 14 725.6*(OCT) + 17 919.6’ (NOV) + 21 295*(DEC)
, ; (138) 1 (2.62) . (2.63) . (3.18) . (3.84)
+ 28 414.2*(JAN) + 25 526.1*(FEB) + 18 260.4*(MAR) + 1 657.9*(APR) + 8 525.6*(MAY)
(4.94) (431) (3.23) (0.32) (1.64)
R2 = .72 DW = 1.72 F = 7.25 -  A . . . / " . V .
Own price elasticity of demand for maize: -1.23 , • ■
Wheat bread cross price elasticity of demand for maize: + 0.44
The results indicate that "June is the month of lowest demand (about 35 000 tons 
purchased per month, given mean levels for PMEAL, PBREAD, and RETENTIONS 
over the estimation period). This is also the period just after harvest, when most of 
the rural farm population eats grain from their own production. Considering the 
extraction rate from maize*to maize meal, the results suggest that about 31 300 
tonnes of meal are consumed during June, This may be assumed to be the quantity 
of commercial meal consumed by the year-round consumers mentioned above. This 
suggests that approximately 375 000 tons of maize are consumed by the year-round 
consumers in a typical year over the estimation period (Figure 3).
Notice that the demand for commercial meal rises progressively and substantially ; 
later in the marketing year. This seasonal pattern corresponds very closely with the 
pattern of grain stock depletion and commercial meal purchases in Figure 2. It must : 
be assumed that the steady rise in demand later in the season, which peaks just 
before the harvest, is attributable largely to rural households running out of own 
grain stocks and not being able to procure grain locally.
The coefficient on RETENTIONS indicates a stropg negative relationship between 
the annual amount of grain produced and retained in communal areas and the 1
11 Since June was the month of lowest demand, the model was standardized in terms 
of this month;: .Elasticities: arid consumption estimates are calculated at the price and 
retention means over the estimation period. ■ ■
Figure 3 : Estimated. seasonal variation in commercial maize meal
consumption and the distribution of consumption between urban and 
rural areas
Estimated consumption from urban, and year-round rural consumers 
Estimated total consumption, normal rainfall year 
Estimated total consumption, 1987/88 marketing year
Source: computed from results of Equation (2).
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demand for maize by millers. The model indicates that for every additional tori of 
maize retained in the communal areas, demand for grain by commercial millers 
declines by 0.32 tons.12 7
The econometric results indicate that the volume ,of urban-milled meal consumed 
in rural areas over the past five years has averaged about 130 000 tons during a 
normal rainfall year, but may rise to 275 000 tons Or, more during a drought year, as 
in 1987/88. This represents about 22 and 36 percent of total commercial maize 
meal sales during a normal and drought year,'respectively.- This rural consumption 
is probably concentrated in the low rainfall communal areas and among households 
working bn commercial farms that were allocated plots of land too small to meet the 
households’ annual grain needs. ' —
A hypothetical but not unlikely scenario may be constructed in which 50 percent of 
the communal area population and 50 percent of the commercial area population 
accounted for the seasonal rise in demand during the 1987 drought year. Under 
these assumptions, the average per capita consumption of commercial meal in the 
rural areas would have been 64 kilograms per year, or approximately 30 percent of 
per capita; grain consumption requirements in Zimbabwe.
EFFECTS OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON HOUSEHOLD INCOMES AND FOOD 
.SECURITY.'
An estimate of the effect on real household income of filling residual grain needs 
by purchasing commercial roller meal rather than grain through the informal market 
is presented in Table 5. Dietary patterns among food secure households show that 
daily grain consumption is about 0.5 kilograms per adult equivalent. Household 
surveys in Natural Regions IV and V indicate that average family size is about 8.0 
in terms of adult equivalents (Stack and Chopak,1991). This indicates that about 
1,460 kilograms of grain is required by an average household per year. Data
12 Grain consumption requirement of 230 kilograms per person per year is from
SADCC (1990).
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Table 5. Estimates, of household cash income loss resulting from 
meeting residual grain requirements with commercial roller meal as 
opposed to grain from informal channel. .• . -
■u Household runs out of own grain stocks in: . 
SEPTEMBER - JANUARY „
1) Annual household grain requirements (kgs) ^ 1,460 1,460
2) Number of days between household stockout and 
green maize availability 165 45 -
3) Residual grain requirement to be met from 
purchases (kgs) ^ ■- 165/365*1460 =660 45/365*1460 =180
4) Cost of residual grain requirement from '-roller T 
meal (Z$ per household)3 - 660 kgs*$.48/kg = $317 180 kgs*$.48/kg = $86
5) Cost of residual grain requirement from grain 
purchase on informal market andjnilling charge 
(Z$ per household)0 ' . '
660 kgs*$.39/kg = $257 . 180 Kgs*$.39/kg - $70
6) Difference in residual procurement costs between 
roller meal and grain from informal market (Z$ 
per household)
$60 - . S16
7) Mean household cash income, lowest income
quartile; Mutoko and Buhera (1988-89 marketing 
year,) (Z$ per household) . . •
$184 $184
8) Mean household cash income, 2nd.lowest income 
quartile, Mutokd and Buhera (1988-89 marketing 
year) (Z$ per household) .
$452 . ' $452
9) (6) as proportion of (7) 33% 9%
10) (6) as proportion of (8) 13% ' r 2%. .
Notes: aThe official roller meal price of $23.50 per 50 kg bag was chosen as a low-end estimate. Actual roller meal 
prices in many remote rural areas during 1990' were somewhat higher than this. DThe informal maize market price of . 
Z$32 per 95kg bag was chosen as a, high-end estimate; informal maize prices observed in the UZ/MSU/SADCC/1CRI SAT study 
never exceeded this price in 25 of 27 wards surveyed during the pre-harvest months of 1990. These wards are all 
in Natural Regions III; IV and V, most of which were affected by moderate drought during the harvest. The $5.00- 
mi.lling charge is 20% higher than the average charge observed in a related survey of informal mi llers^during 1990. 
Source: data from UZ/MSU/ICRISAT Grain Marketing Surveys, 1990. . ■
presented m Figure 2 indicate that in 1989 (a moderate but hot unusual drought 
year), 25 percent of households surveyed in Runde and Mberengwa (Natural Regions 
IV and IV /V ) fan put .of own grain supplies by September (about 165 days before 
green maize is available-from the next harvest); 50 percent ran out by January 1990 
(about 45 days before the green maize). Under these two scenarios, Table 5 
illustrates the reduction in real household income from purchasing commercial roller 
meal at prescribed prices instead of maize in the market, assuming an informal price 
of $32 per 95kg bag plus a $5 per bag milling charge. Reference incomes are the 
mean cash incomes recorded in Buhera and Mutoko communal areas (Natural 
Regions IV and V), for households in the lowest income quartile (Row 7), and for 
those in the second lowest*income quartile (Row 8; Stack and Chopak, 1991).
This simulation suggests that households in the lowest income quartile that ran out 
of grain in September and had to buy roller meal instead of grain at $32 per bag 
would have incurred a'33 percent loss in real annual household income. Since this 
is a non-marginal change in income, it is more likely that such households would, 
reduce their intake of grain, with potentially adverse effects on food security. Even 
for households, in the second income quartile, 13 percent of annual cash income 
would be absorbed in the higher acquisition price of commercial meal. Nine and 
two percent, respectively, of annual cash income would be lost if the household 
depleted its grain reserves by January. 1 c •
In addition to the direct effect on real incomes and,food consumption of deficit rural 
households, .thecurrent system .suffers from the follqwing: ; i
1. Refined urban-milled meal is less nutritious than straight-run maize meal 
, ground through small hammer mills commonly operating in communal areas.
: . Specifically, the refined commercial meal conta:ins less proteinV less fiber, and' 
less oil than straight-run meal. f
2. ' Most rural people prefer the taste-of locally-processed meal to more refined 
, commercial meal. In the survey of 648 households in seven communal areas,
71 percent said they would prefer a bag of locally-milled meal over an equal­
sized bag of any type of commercial meal. Based on taste alone, 88 percent 
said that they preferred sadza (the staple dish) made with locally-milled meal.
The slight difference between taste preferences and overall preferences is 
mostly because locally-milled meal takes longer to cook. ,
3. The movement of grain ! out' of deficit communal areas and into the 
GMB/urban milling system reduces demand for and investment in rural grain 
storage apd milling. The potential employment and multiplier effects o f rural 
: grain processing, stockfeed manufacturing, and other agro-industries are thus
lost to rural communities and Captured in the urban areas. t
.4. Substantial amounts of scarce transport are tied up in GMB freight contracts 
betvveen collection points, depots, and urban silos (Jayne et al,, 1989). The 
r portion of this haulage that is moved circuitously back to rural areas adds to  
. GMB’s storage and transport costs, and contributes u^ecessSrily to the 
transport bottlenecks currently plaguing Zimbabwe’s economy. - :
5. High-priced grain for rural consumers in the form of commercial maize meal \ 
depresses the quantity of GMB maize demanded by urban mills, thus inflating 
the size and costs of government stockpiling;13 -T he econometric results 
indicate that national demand for grain by millers, a derived demand for 
maize meal, is quite elastic. The ability to reduce acquisition costs of grain 
in rural areas through the development of viable informal trade could greatly 
relieve the government’s maize oversupply problem and the costs associated ! 
with it. The Shortage,of maize grain to buy in many communal lands later in 
the. season is particularly ironic considering the mountains of maize currently' 
held by the government, significant amounts of which were purchased in the 1 
deficit areas. This irony is at least a partial side effect of the current 
organization of the market. : , ‘ ’
CONSTRAINTS TO INFORMAL GRAIN TRADING
What accounts for the fact that grain is not being adequately redistributed through 
informal trade, ehh$f spatially from. surplus areas to deficit locations inthe same or 
another communal area, or temporally from post-harvest pefidds^Of-abuhSahce to 
pre-harvest periods of scarcity? ^
Traders were asked questions about various types of trading activities tq< clarify the ^ 
constraints to investment in grain trading specifically. In addition, rural businessmen
13 Government maize stocks have constituted oyer 1,5 years of demand pn average 
over the past five years. , v ^  !
^ ‘ - y  \  i s  ' ■ - ■ -  ;
who were, not involved in grain trading were also interviewed. These shopowners 
Were chosen to identify factors limiting new entry into grain marketing activities.
Some ahalystshave suggested that the underdevelopment of informal grain markets 
may be due to a general lack of profit in this activity (Amin, 1990). This contention 
does not appear to be supported by the responses oTrural traders and shopowners. 
Grain trading, milling, and transport were identified as the second, third, and'fourth 
most profitable activities in which to invest in Zimbabwe’s rural areas (opening a 
restaurant/bottle store was first). y
However, only 32 percent of the respondents who identified these grain marketing 
activities expressed an actual intention to undertake or expand investment in any of 
them. The major barriers to investment and new entry can be grouped into three 
broad categories: limited resources necessary to engage in trading, ambiguity of 
state regulations governing informal grain trade, and government policy restrictions^ 
on the movement and resale of grain.
Limited Resources /
Working Capital: The viability of grain trading depends on exploiting economies of 
scale in transactions.. Buying enough maize from the GMB to fill a 5-tonne truck 
requires almost twice the annual income of the average Zimbabwean. Not 
surprisingly, the inability to secure loans through either the formal or informal sector 
represented a major barrier to grain trading. Those actually involved in grain 
trading almost always used ohly‘their own funds as working capital. This creates 
barriers to entry by restricting potential entrants from capturing scale economies in 
distribution and thus depresses net returns. Those who can capture such scale 
economies with own cash are probably.the.relatively wealthy traders..
Limited transport capacity: Only 60 percent o f  the rural traders surveyed owned a 
vehicle (Figure 4), Less than 50 percent owned a vehicle with the capacity to carry 
more than 20 bags of grain. Shortages o f credit also limit investment in this critical
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means of trade. The availability of vehicles to purchase is severely restricted in 
Zimbabwe due to a 60 percent import tax on foreign-purchased vehicles and limited 
domestic production. An interview with the general manager of a major truck dealer 
in Harare revealed that, while receiving over 3,500 orders for trucks, the dealership 
was allocated only 30 vehicles from domestic production. Only 1,000 heavy trucks 
are produced domestically each year,, but these are largely rationed through non- 
market means. The manager estimated that over 50,000 trucks would be needed to 
alleviate the critical transport shortages currently facing Zimbabwe’s economy.
Access to hired transport in the remote areas is reduced further by the poor quality 
of roads, particularly in the rainy periods,. The period just before harvest is critical 
since many households will have depleted their grain stocks and need to buy grain.
Shppowners have found commercial maize meal trading to be a convenient substitute 
for grain trading because'(1) most commercial millers or wholesalers deliver their 
meal to retailers’ shops even in rural areas, and (2) the demand for commercial meal 
is guaranteed by the unavailability of grain locally. It is therefore rational for traders 
to seek trade in commodities that maximize returns to their limited transport 
capacity., ' ■ --y.
Seventy-three percent Of respondents who possessed a-truck did engage in grain 
trading, yet it was often a passive form of trading, in which grain would be bought 
by the trader only if customers brought it to his shop. Very little; active procurement 
of grain in known surplus villages was detected.
Because of the currently unspecialized nature of informal grain trade, buyers in 
surplus areas must find their own means of disposing of the grain, typically to 
consumers or GMB. There were nO reported cases of resale between traders, 
indicating a less specialized informal marketing system than those commonly found 
in other developing countries, in which first handlers, wholesalers, and retailers have 
developed their own.niche in the marketing channel. Lack of specialization inflates 
information and. management requirements as well as transactions costs associated
‘ with grain trade. As a result, many respondents stated that an expansion of grain | 
trading would require investing in a new a shop or using a relative’s home in a l
deficit area as a. place to sell grain procured in surplus areas. This is because no ■
open markets exist in which to sell grain to wholesalers or retailers.With a better 
knowledge of supply and demand characteristics in other locations.
This process of expanding the number of shops to accommodate grain trading again 
exacerbates the working capital constraint. It also increases management capacity 
problems, since only members of the family are trusted to hold responsible positions. ; 
Several shopowners, stated that they would need a trustworthy employee/salesrriari 
or relative with good knowledge of local market conditions, and that such 
, salespersons are hard to come by. Lack of trust in employees pot only requires strict 
' supervision and record-keeping but(also increases transaction costs. . There is,
: , however, potential to overcome this hinderance through advertising which would 
enable the traders themselves to prescribe days which they would trade and thus 
concentrate the buying and selling ofgrain into specified time periods. This would 
reduce the risk and cost associated with employing a. salesman. Yet the advertising 
of grain to sell and buy -- which in the absence of open markets assumes increased . 
importance -- is currently suppressed, since informal traders often perceive their 
: activities to be illegal. /
Confusion over regulations governing grain trade  ^ ^
Informal marketing of grain is circumscribed by the; Grain Marketing Act, which 
■ , divides the whole country into two areas, "A" and "B-'Area "A" consists mainly of 
th el urge-seal e-farming areas, most small-scale commercial farming areas, arid urban 
centres. Area "B" is predominantly the.communal lands and,game reserves^ The 
v ■; Act ^  states that: '■
1. Area "A" is controlled; and Area "B" is uncontrolled;
2. The GMB /...won’t be concerned with what goes on in Area "B", and main
attehtiori will focus  ^6n Area "A"’; - : / / - y  ■
y /V \/3 s  /•'•Anyone will be permitted to acquire and sell or resell the,c6ntr611ed...’maiz!e
V
y in Area "B"...without reference to the Board provided that the controlled 
product does not leave Area "B"; if they do leave Area "B" its destination 
must be the GMB, and the only people who will be in -a position to deliver 
it to the Board will be approved and registered by the Board. These people 
include direct producers, co-operatives and approved buyers and all of these 
should be in possession of a GMB card/
In addition, approved buyers, as opposed to^  informal buyers, have a contract with 
the GMB. Approved buyers may not directly resell grain that was purchased from 
farmers .except to the GMB. Since the GMB’s prices are pan-seasonal, approved 
buyers are provided no incentive to store grain. The current organization of the 
market effectively bars a large group of grain traders from engaging in a socially 
useful function.
While the rules governing grain trading are clearly stated in GMB publications, they 
are nevertheless subject to a wide variety of interpretations, both, within the GMB 
and in rural areas. . As mentioned above, four of five GMB depot managers 
interviewed believed it to be illegal for anyone to purchase grain from the depot in 
excess of his. consumption needs, and particularly if the grain was to be resold. 
Hence, a private trader who wanted to buy truckloads of grain for resale to deficit 
households in his area would be subject to prior questioning. And if that trader was 
to confess that he was buying in order to resell, he would be denied the opportunity 
to buy from the GMB. The few GMB managers interviewedjiinted that private 
traders were likely to set exploitative grain retail prices in remote deficit areas14. 
Apparently, this argument appeared strong and common to all depots visited, thus 
supporting that, at present, only a few informal traders buy grain from the GMB 
depots, countrywide. In fact, this survey found out that those traders who bought 
from the GMB either bought in unsuspicious small quantities, hence failing to 
achieve economies of scale, or pretended to be transporters who were buying and . 
transporting on behalf of those grain deficit households who had no transport. The
14 This seems ironical given that commercial maize meal obtained through the 
GMB-yfban milling system is 10 to 80 percent more expensive than maize meal prices 
observed in informal marketing channels.
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de facto restrictions on buying grain for resale in rural areas provides urban 
commercial millers with a de facto monopoly on grain distribution into deficit areas* Y 
to the detriment of informal grain trade. *
Second, the majority of informal traders lack sufficient information on rules 
governing grain trade and hence perceive grain trading as illegal regardless of 
whether the product is controlled or not in the area in vvhich they trade. An 
illustration of this was the reluctance of many traders to initially admit to 
enumerators that they traded grain despite being identified by surveyed households 
as the ones with which they traded.- In fact, about ten percent of the original sample 
pf informal traders refused to be interviewed. The incredible difficulty faced by 
enumerators in gaining the trust of informal traders highlights the risk they attached . 
to their grain trading activities. . . ■ Y
Third, informal traders were asked whether or not trade of red sorghum, mhunga 
and rapoko was legal outside of communal areas! The government decontrolled .
: these crops in 1989, making it legal for informal traders to sell to commercial buyers Y \ 
in urban areas. Surprisingly, only 27 percent were aware the change in rules. 
Thirty-one percent were confident that it: was illegal to trade these three crops, and 
43 percent were not s in e .; Even mpre; surprising were results from surveys o f  
approved buyers, who, through their day-to-day interaction with the Board, have 
greater access to information and therefore are expected to have .more updated 
knowledge of rules governing grain trade. However, pf those interviewed, Only 33 
percent were aware Of the changes in regulations. Fifty percent still perceived it - 
illegal to trade mhunga, red , sorghum, and rapoko outside of their area and 16 
percent were not sure. v - \  /Y.Y.' YY:-v --YY;: ']
Lastly,; four informal traders^ reported that approved buyers threatened to report Y 
them to .the.ppUoe,for trading grain informally — even within their own communal 
area, which is legal. While the ambiguity (of trading regulations has not precluded 
the development o f informal trade, it is apparently of lower volume and higher costs 
than if the rules were clear and government actually took steps ;tp actively support
j
such intra-rural trading activity. ,
Marketing policy restrictions
Apart from misperceptions concerning grain marketing regulations,, rural grain 
traders are legally constrained by two important government restrictions mentioned 
-earlier: '
1. Maize is prohibited from crossing Zone A areas (commercial farming and 
urban areas) into Zone B (communal areas). Furthermore, grain may not 
legally pass from surplus communal areas into deficit communal areas if this
y  requires passing through a Zone A area; '
2. Grain delivered to rural collection points or Approved Buyers cannot be 
resold directly to consumers. Instead, the grain must be forwarded to the 
nearest GMB depot, usually located in town centres.
Both of these rules tend to exacerbate the problem of grain shortages in semi-arid 
areas later in the season. The rules also contribute to the importance of commercial 
maize meal in rural areas, despite its higher costs and lower preference compared 
with locally milled meal.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Many analysts have tended to think of grain marketing, price, and storage policy 
options in terms of finding the optimal trade-offs between price stability, 
consumption, budgetary costs, and other government objectives -  holding market 
structure constant. The results of this paper suggest that greater focus on the 
restructuring of the market itself may, considerably reduce the magnitude of these 
trade-offs. Rural food security and GMB budget outlays may both be positively 
affected by the development of well-functioning, competitive informal grain markets.
A major policy issue; is whether the grain market can be restructured in such a way 
that the GMB maintains its positive functions such as holding buffer stocks to guard 
against drought and providing a stable floor price for surplus producers, while
y - V  v  ;V-: 2 1  -V;-
simultaneously promoting the development of intra-rural informal trade. Although 
certain major changes may provide the greatest benefits over the long run, it is 
important to understand the skepticism with which private traders are viewed in 
some government circles; These misgivings, coupled with the facts that the effects 
of promoting informal grain distribution are untested in Zimbabwe and represent a ; 
distinct shift away from the highly controlled and regulated current, system, may 
motivate toward a more gradual approach to reform. This would allow government 
to test the effects o f adjustments, and, if successful, progressively restructure the 
system in line with its objectives.15
Toward this end, several policy options should be seriously Considered: .
1. . Publish and widely disseminate information pertaining to-the regulations
governing grain trade in Zimbabwe, rather than have traders ferry grain at 
. night.. Some research may be needed to determine effective methods of 
transmitting information on market regulations in rural areas.
2. Publish and widely distribute information that the GMB sells grain at depots. 
Make the conditions under which, and the maximum amount that a trader 
can buy from the GMB explicit.
3. Abolish restrictions on the movement of grain produced in Zone B areas. 
The GMB would.still procure grain from Zone A  and surplus areas of Zone 
B, which would allow it to meet urban demand and maintain, strategic buffer 
stocks, The. GMB would also maintain its role as a residual buyer in all 
areas, effectively offering a floor price to guard against adverse price
. -5 Recent events in Zambia and Tanzania demonstrate the risks qf immediate and , 
full market decontrol. Following food' riots in 1987, President Kaunda renounced the 
IMF-sponsored structural adjustment programmes and returned the country-toits prior 
system of administered, pricing. Zambia’s grain policy has since flip-flopped several 
times, abolishing its marketing board, NAMBOARD, in the process. This approach to 
full decontrol followed by reinstitution of controls has probably not mitigated the current 
disarray in Zambia’s grain markets. In Tanzania, the government also restricted the 
operation of private grainvtraders in 1989/90 after sweeping decontrol several years 
earlier. This was apparently because the National Milling Corporation and Cooperative 
Unions could no longer compete with the private traders (Amani and Kapunda, 1990). . 
It is conceivable that a, more gradual process of market reform may have facilitated 
monitoring and measured responses to the changes that reform was bringing, thus 
avoiding the backlash that returned Tanzania’s, grain markets to a heavily administered • 
albeit ineffective system of control.
fluctuations. Decontrol of grain movement from Zone A  to Zone B would 
likely have a number of effects on grain distribution and pricing that meed to 
be identified through future research. The adoption of such reforms may 
. include an evaluation component to monitor the adjustments made after 
decontrol. ??
4. Expand the function of-rural collection points to include the sale of grain to 
rural consumers as well as procurement for commercial buyers. The added 
costs to GMB associated with grading and selling could be reduced by 
conducting sales only once or twice a week. Such costs would almost surely
. be less than the social costs of transporting grain onward to main depots, 
handling and storing the grain by the GMB, and transporting expensive 
commercial meal or food aid back into these deficit areas. To the extent that 
the retention of grain in rural areas would reduce the costs of drought relief 
food aid borne by the Ministry of Social Welfare, this Agency could partially 
compensate the GMB for the added costs of grading and selling at collection
' points.
Removal of resale restrictions at these known sources of supplies would also 
expand the scope for intra-rural trade considerably by reducing the search 
 ^ costs of grain procurement for redistribution by informal traders.
5. Allow approved buyers to become "approved sellers". Under such an 
arrangement, the GMB would set selling prices at which the approved 
jpuyer/seller could sell grain to local consumers. This price would have to be 
high enough to provide incentives to the trader, and would have to allow for 
the trader’s cumulative storage costs. Over the long run, the need for 
controlling the selling price may become obsolete if a sufficient number Of 
such "approved sellers" were operating in an area to ensure competition.
6. Develop government support for new entry and investment in rural grain 
trade. The Zimbabwe Development Bank or SEDCO could play a role by 
targeting credit for, specific private investments.such as vehicles, hammer 
mills, spare parts, storage, and marketplace facilities in rural areas; This 
could be complemented by government investment in rural road 
infrastructure, and elimination of import restrictions on vehicles and spare 
parts. Promotion :6f new entry in grain trading is necessary to ensure that 
sufficient numbers of traders are in operation to promote competition.
Greater grain availability in semi-arid rural areas would also promote the 
development of rural hammer millers, dehullers, brewers, and other agro-based 
industries requiring adequate and reliable volumes of grain to be available for 
purchase. Currently, such agro-based industries are highly concentrated, and are 
located in the major urban areas. A higher proportion of grain traded and processed 
locally, may create rural employment and multiplier effects that are currently
confined to urban areas.
Changes in the grain marketing system may be an important precondition for success 
in the government’s efforts to promote crop diversification into higher valued cash 
crops (Chigume and Jayne, forthcoming). These crops may be "higher-valued" when 
their net returns are compared against those from growing maize for sale. However, 
in grain deficit areas, the true opportunity cost of foregoing maize production is 
related to the acquisition price of commercial maize meal -  some 110 percent abbve 
the GMB maize producer price. Market development that successfully reduces rural 
consumer grain prices may stimulate cotton and oilseed production and promote 
income growth in some of the less-favoured rural areas. J
CONCLUDING REMARKS
' - ' ,'  . • " \
It is therefore not a paradox that rural food insecurity persists despite a 300 percent 
increase in official grain sales since independence. On the surface, the situation is 
due to substantial variation among households’ productive resources, the ability to 
produce a marketable grain surplus, and other income earning opportunities. Yet 
the historical and current orientation of agricultural policy toward surplus producers 
and the neglect of rural market development for consumers has certainly contributed, 
to these income inequalities and the current level of food insecurity in the country. 
While great strides have been made since independence to provide formal market 
outlets for smallholders’ surplus production, the income gains have been highly 
concentrated among relatively well-endowed households, especially those in high- 
potential areas. By contrast, the structure of the market has effectively taxed rural 
consumers by restricting the development of informal intra-rural grain trade, thus 
inflating the acquisition price of grain meal in these areas. These grain-deficit 
households tend to belong to the lowest income strata in the rural areas. ' 
Recognition of the magnitude of grain deficits in many rural areas may lead to a 
reorientation of agricultural and nutrition policy in which broad based rural income 
growth is seen to depend on reducing consumer prices in rural areas as well as 
raising producer returns.. .
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These results may hold important lessons for other countries in Southern Africa also 
possessing centralized grain distribution systems and large surplus stocks. Grain 
"surpluses" delivered from rural areas to parastatal depots, while giving the illusion 
of self-sufficiency, may mask and even contribute to considerable food insecurity in 
these countries. The reforms suggested in this paper would not require the 
government to relinquish control of grain pricing and distribution tasks that it 
currently performs. Such reforms would rather encourage government to facilitate 
market development -  through selected changes in market regulation and active 
support for investment and new entry in informal trade — in rural areas where the 
GMB has been unable to reach.
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